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ABSTRACT
The Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) conducted ter-
rorist attacks in Greece for 27 years (1975-2002), making it the most
durable of the militant Leftist revolutionary groups that emerged
from the European radical milieu of the 1970s. 17N went to great
lengths in its communiqués — and eventually in trial testimony — to
position itself as the only authentic, progressive political force in
post-Junta Greece. In spite of the absence of any demonstrable mass
political constituency, 17N’s leaders convinced themselves that they
represented the vanguard of political change in the country. But 17N
was never an authentic revolutionary group. Instead, it was a clan-
destine band of disillusioned armed militants with a flair for revolu-
tionary rhetoric and symbolism for whom terrorism had become a
way of life: a career. Its members lived in a closed, self-referential
world where terrorism became a way of life from which it was impos-
sible to walk away or to confront reality. Feeling themselves to be a
genuine instrument of history, 17N leaders believed that it did not
matter that there could never be a military victory as long as 17N,
‘intervened’ and ‘resisted.’ For their operational leader, Dimitris
Koufodinas, and many of his comrades what was important was the
act of ‘resistance’ itself and the notion that blood and death, even
one’s own, would carry the mission forward, ultimately securing 17N
a place in history.
INTRODUCTION
The long history of Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)’s ter-
rorism in Greece ended on 5 September 2002, when the group’s leader of opera-
tions, Dimitris Koufodinas, turned himself in to the police after two months on
the run. Koufodinas pulled up at police headquarters on Alexandras Avenue in a
taxi at 2.35 pm, dressed in jeans, a black T-shirt, sunglasses, and a jockey. “I am
Dimitris Koufodinas and I have come to turn myself in,” he told the stunned duty
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officer before being taken to the twelfth floor of the anti-terrorism squad.
Koufodinas had been on the run since 29 June 2002 when a bomb being carried
by Savvas Xiros, a senior 17N gunman, detonated prematurely in Piraeus. Soon
after, from his hospital bed and apparently fearing for his life, Xiros gave the
prosecutor in charge of the anti-terrorism investigation critical information that
fuelled a chain reaction of arrests, leading in less than a month to the dismantling
of the group which had acted with impunity for 27 years.1
The capture of Koufodinas and his group marked the demise of the last and
most stubborn of a generation of ideological terrorists whose campaigns caused
serious political and security problems in Western Europe for more than a quar-
ter of a century. 17N, often referred to as organossi phantasma or phantom
organization, was named after the day in 1973 when the military junta used tanks
to crush a student-worker occupation of the Athens Polytechnic. Fanatically
nationalistic, the group was anti-Greek establishment, bitterly anti-American,
anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO, and was committed to removing US bases from
Greek soil, the Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and severing Greece’s
ties to NATO and the European Union. Acting as the armed vanguard of the
working class and the defender of Greek national independence, 17N carried out
more than 100 attacks, assassinating US officials, Greek politicians, magistrates,
newspaper publishers, industrialists, and ship-owners; planting bombs under-
neath the cars of diplomats; and firing rockets against foreign embassies and
businesses.2 Astonishingly, in all this time not one 17N terrorist was either killed
or injured in an operation or as a result of actions by the Greek security and intel-
ligence agencies. Nor did any undercover agent ever succeed in penetrating the
group. The astronomical rewards offered by the Greek and US authorities went
unclaimed. 
In December 2003, after a marathon nine-month trial3 held in a purpose-
built courtroom in Athens’ largest maximum-security prison, a three-member tri-
bunal convicted 15 members of the group while another four were acquitted due
to lack of sufficient evidence. The court upheld the state prosecutor’s recom-
mendation for 21 life terms and a 25-year sentence for accused leader and chief
ideologue Alexandros Giotopoulos while Koufodinas — the group’s operational
leader — received 13 life sentences and 25 years in jail. Other life plus 25 year
sentences were handed down to hitmen Christodoulos Xiros (10 life terms), his
brother Savvas (six life terms), Vassilis Tzortzatos (four life terms), and Iraklis
Kostaris (four life terms).4
The Early Years
17N emerged at a time when Western Europe was the most active terrorist
scene in the world. The mid-1970s was a period of Red and Black terror, state-
sponsored political assassinations, kidnappings, and indiscriminate public bomb-
ings. In theory, 17N’s main aim was to change the pattern of Greek society and
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move it toward a revolutionary situation. Like the Red Army Faction (RAF) in
Germany, Action Directe (AD) in France, and the Red Brigades (BR) in Italy,
17N also used the argument that “if violence constitutes the most efficient and
essential instrument without which the revolution cannot succeed, then it is
desired, rational and justified.”5 However, the group’s trajectory and organiza-
tional evolution had been considerably different from those other revolutionary
groups.
Unlike the RAF, BR, and AD, 17N did not begin as a loose network of
minor groupings that shared general extreme-left orientations. Both BR and AD
originally emerged from various cells with names such as CPM (Collettivo
Politico Metropolitan) and Clodo (Comite liquidant ou detournant les ordina-
teurs).6 Conversely, 17N never attempted to expand its sphere of influence on
the national territory, which partly explains the organization’s operational conti-
nuity and its remarkable resistance to infiltration. Another striking difference
between 17N and other groups was its targeting strategy. 
Most revolutionary communist groups on the European scene graduated
from low-level bombings to more lethal attacks. It was almost four years before
the AD progressed from minor bombings to the assassination of the French gen-
eral René Audran in January 1985. The Belgian Communist Combatant Cells
(CCC) had carried out twenty-six bombings before it even considered a lethal
attack and Italy’s BR went through seven years and two major operational phas-
es before its leaders decided to ‘raise its sights’ from kneecappings to assassina-
tions.7 17N adopted a radically different approach: they started off by killing
their targets.   
17N used its first three attacks to gain public sympathy and galvanize left-
wing extremists into action. From 1975 to 1980, 17N attacks were deliberately
designed to identify the group with the concerns of the Greek masses and to cap-
italize on public perceptions of American complicity in the emergence of the mil-
itary dictatorship in Greece and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The group tar-
geted symbolic enemies of the Greek populace, such as the USA and members
of the 1967-74 police apparatus, to demonstrate its ethno-patriotic credentials
and to highlight the fact that the first post-junta government of Konstantinos
Karamanlis had allowed “crimes committed against the Greek people” to go
unpunished.  After killing Richard Welch, the CIA’s station chief in Athens, 17N
tried to link American hegemonism to long-standing domestic problems, arguing
that the continuing US presence humiliated Greek people and disfigured all
aspects of national life. Conveying its rage through the dramatized style of the
communiqué, 17N declared that,
enough is enough. The American imperialists and their domestic
agents must understand that the Greek people are not a flock of
sheep. They must also understand that this time the people won’t
swallow their lies, provocations and poisonous propaganda; they
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have realised that the Americans have tied the [Karamanlis first post-
junta] government’s hand behind its back so it has no independence
of action and thus can do absolutely nothing. The main slogan of the
1973 Polytechnic uprising ‘out with the Americans’ remains today
unfulfilled. The Americans are not out and what is worse, the gov-
ernment allows even more to come on national soil: multinational
monopolies have moved here from Lebanon and the CIA moved its
Middle East headquarters from Beirut to Athens. For the Americans,
Greece continues to be a xefrago ambeli like it was throughout the
dictatorship. A Latin American Banana Republic in the Southern
Mediterranean.8
Seeking to link political activism, class conflict, and the armed struggle,
the group released in April 1977 its manifesto, entitled, Appantissi sta Kommata
kai tis Organosseis [A Response to Political Parties and Organizations].9 The 28-
page text presented the group’s analysis and interpretations of political realities
in post-1974 Greece. As its title indicated, the manifesto was a polemical
response against mainstream political parties, extra-parliamentary organizations
of the left and  intelligentsia, as well as a critique concerned with the prospects
and obstacles of democratisation in post-junta Greece. 17N offered an analysis
of a society that required violence in order to be changed. The group, in fact, saw
its violence as a logical and inevitable political consequence of national and con-
stitutional processes. Greece’s recent historical experience, it explained, “had
very clearly shown that there could be no peaceful transition to socialism.”10
According to 17N, “to even mention transition to Socialism via peaceful, parlia-
mentary, democratic means is, for Greece at least, an idiocy.”11
At the same time, 17N attacked all mainstream political parties, especially
the two Greek communist parties (KKE). The group charged that the KKE and
the KKE-Interior had become fully reconciled to the political institutions and
practices of the post-1974 regime, and were continuing the work of the
Karamanlis government by effectively sabotaging the dynamics of class struggle.
17N also devoted half of its manifesto to challenging the extra-parliamentary
left’s notion of them as utopia-driven militants. The main criticism by the extra-
parliamentary left was that 17N-style terrorist violence was counter-productive;
it could only provoke stronger state repression and have damaging consequences
for the movement. Predictably, 17N dismissed that view as “a classic revisionist
argument,” arguing that its actions “shouldn’t be seen as isolated acts of vio-
lence, but as parts of a long-term, multi-faceted revolutionary process.”12 The
group advocated revolutionary violence as a response to right-wing pressure and
declining working-class radicalism. A belief that the organized proletariat could
shape history allowed 17N to view violence as legitimate, heroic, and politically
effective, and thus the most vital instrument of social war against bourgeois
democracy.
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The Only Road to a Socialist Greece: 17N in the 1980s
After the electoral landslide of socialist PASOK in October 1981, 17N dis-
appeared for two years. However, the assassination of US Navy Captain George
Tsantes, head of the Joint US Military Advisory Group in Greece (JUSMAGG)
naval division, and his Greek driver in November 1983 heralded the transition of
revenge terrorism to a full-scale terrorist campaign. After the attack, 17N
attacked Socialist premier Andreas Papandreou for renewing the US base agree-
ment and breaking his pledges to pull out of both NATO and the European
Community (EC).  In 17N’s eyes,  Papandreou’s ‘betrayal’ was a strong and suf-
ficient justification for terrorism and became the ideological catalyst that con-
firmed the group’s view that ‘popular revolutionary violence’ and not parlia-
mentarianism was the only road to socialism. 
Less than five months after the Tsantes hit, in April 1984, 17N attacked but
failed to assassinate JUSMAGG Master Sergeant Robert Judd in a fresh attempt
to draw attention to the continued operation of the US bases in Greece. The group
used the attacks as an occasion to declare war against the Americans, inaugurat-
ing a campaign of violence to remove them from Greece. It is characteristic that
both the Tsantes and Judd communiqués opened with identical paragraphs: “The
bases will not leave with either elections or with parliamentary methods. . . .
Only dynamic mass struggle and justified revolutionary violence will force them
out.”13 The core argument of the communiqués was that “imperialist dependence
is the main problem of the country.”14 17N argued that decades of Western impe-
rialist exploitation and oppression had deformed national political life and
blocked the country’s economic system. Adapting a classic Marxist-Leninist
analysis of imperialism, the group also pointed out that this “specific model of
economic development imposed by the American-led imperialist katestimeno
(establishment)” had durable consequences for the development of both social
relations and the productive forces in the country.15
By 1984, it was clear that 17N was determined to use any operational tools
and military tactics to achieve a complete removal of the “US occupation forces”
in Greece. The group became convinced that a constant level of military activity
would eventually lead to the complete paralysis of American military forces in
Greece. Following the basic mechanisms of the Provisional IRA strategy in
Northern Ireland and the RAF in Germany, 17N attempted to use its limited
resources to wage a war of psychological attrition against Americans stationed in
Greece.16 At the same time, vitriolic attacks on the PASOK government contin-
ued unabated. 17N charged that in spite of their messianic rhetoric the Socialists
in office had come to emulate New Democracy governmental ethics and prac-
tices. Convinced that PASOK was “now working for the Right, which explains
why it has yet to be overthrown,”17 17N took the view that there was no alterna-
tive but to widen the struggle through maximum coercive pressure on the Greek
government. 
Kassimeris  5/13/09  6:54 PM  Page 133
Winter 2007
134
17N’s determination to “participate” in the political process culminated in
the assassinations of the “main representatives” of the LMAT or “lumpen big
bourgeois class.”18 The group devoted thousands of words to giving substance to
the view that the country’s plutocrats, the LMAT, were responsible for the deep
polarizations running from top to bottom of Greece’s inequality-riven society. By
attacking the key representatives of the LMAT, 17N believed it was attacking
deceit, self-interest, the scandalous privileges of tax exemptions, capitalist
exploitation, and corporate greed, which were the root causes for the country’s
economic decline, de-industrialization, total stagnation, and miserable working-
class living standards. Combating LMAT-led capitalist exploitation was also the
alleged motivation for the bomb attacks against several tax-revenue offices that
year. Describing the country’s taxation system as “a mechanism of robbing the
people’s income,” 17N used the bombings as a device to bring to wider attention
what it saw as blatant provocation.19 The group charged that “the swindler-state”
used taxation to “steal from the working people to give back to the sharks of
LMAT and international imperialism.”20 17N believed that Greek society should
no longer tolerate tax evasion on the present massive scale. To make the point
clearer still, 17N said that more than “450 billion drachma [US$ 1.45 billion] in
tax revenues flew abroad each year” with disastrous effect on the population’s
living standards, as it undermined “the provision of essential public services such
as education, health, welfare, infrastructure and national security.”21
The national health service, in particular, was a 17N central concern: the
group held that Greece’s health system was a disgrace. Public expenditure on
health was extremely low and the quality of services dismal. Health profession-
als and managers, according to 17N, were primarily responsible for the poor
quality of care and shambolic services. Instead of delivering decent health care
to patients, 17N declared, doctors ruthlessly exploited them. The kneecaping
attack on Zacharias Kapsalakis, well-known neurosurgeon and owner of
Engefalos medical centre, in February 1987 was both “an act of protest and
dynamic resistance” against dehumanization and “a warning to all those doctors
— big and otherwise — pocketing brown envelopes from desperate patients in
public hospitals and private clinics.”22 The Kapsalakis communiqué closed with
17N demands for universal and equal health-care provision and “modern, clean
and comfortable hospitals.”23
Increased tension in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey over oil-
drilling rights and other territorial disputes absorbed most of the group’s atten-
tion during 1987-88. Its response to the Sismik-I crisis in March, which brought
the two NATO allies close to war, was to attack US military targets in Athens.
Holding NATO, and the United States in particular, responsible for the crisis,
17N bombed two US military buses in the space of four months. 17N believed
that the US was behind “expansionist Turkish militarism.” Referring to the
Sismik-I episode, the group claimed that Washington was deliberately instigating
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Turkey’s expansionist designs in the Aegean and in Cyprus to increase Greek
reliance on American military protection.  
Opposition to US imperialism and impending Greek-American talks over
the extension of the 1983 US military bases agreement in Greece motivated a
barrage of 17N attacks. The 17N leadership assumed that a consistent level of
military activity against American targets would put pressure on the US and
Greek governments. From April 1987 to the end of June 1988, five of the group’s
six attacks were against American and Turkish targets. 17N declared that Greek
national sovereignty was non-negotiable and warned that it “would not allow any
Papandreou to sell it off.”24 Until the Papandreou government closed all
American bases, removed the 164 nuclear warheads, and took the country out of
NATO, 17N was determined to continue at all costs its battle against “the mur-
dering American imperialists” stationed on Greek soil.25
In 1988, corruption became the focus of attention for the group. Having
reached the conclusion that Greek politicians on all sides had cheating in their
bloodstream, 17N argued that the Bank of Crete scandal was symptomatic of a
society in a serious crisis. The collapse of the Socialist government and prosecu-
tion of Papandreou and four of his senior ministers on corruption charges relat-
ed to the multi-billion drachma Bank of Crete embezzlement and illegal phone-
tapping confirmed the group’s belief that Greek democracy was deeply flawed.
The Bank of Crete scandal, 17N explained in a communiqué, was symptomatic
of “a society in a political, financial, cultural and moral crisis.”26 Greece, 17N
argued, was in desperate need of catharsis but “effective catharsis and corrup-
tion-cleansing had to go hand-in-hand with the wholesale change of its political
and judicial world.”27 Before 1989 was out, 17N had targeted two state magis-
trates, a former PASOK minister (one of the four ex-ministers indicted on bribery
charges), and New Democracy’s chief parliamentary spokesman, and son-in-law
of the party’s leader, Pavlos Bakoyiannis for their alleged involvement in the
scandal. The aim of 17N’s intensive military activity was to keep popular atten-
tion focused on the underlying political causes of the crisis and unmask the key
figures responsible for the “looting” of the Bank of Crete. These attacks were
also intended to destabilize further the state and dictate the course of events. 17N
used the Bakoyiannis assassination in particular to send a clear warning against
the “corrupt and rotten establishment.”28 Soon afterwards, the cabinet, in an
emergency session, increased the information-reward to 200 million drachma,
changed the entire police leadership, announced a new set of counter-terrorism
measures, and a serious hunt for 17N militants began.
Despite police pressure, 17N raids against an Athens police station, a mil-
itary warehouse, and the National Museum expanded the group’s arsenal con-
siderably, and suggested the lengths to which 17N was prepared to go in order to
influence everyday political discourse. A solid mixture of ideological absolutism
and militant ‘vanguardism,’ which soon degenerated into cold-blooded extrem-
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ism, led the group to assert that its armed struggle was crucial. 17N began to
claim that its 15-year armed struggle was “the only remaining legitimate and
moral struggle against the homicidal and barbaric political regime.”29
During the same period, 17N’s ideological antipathy toward the new New
Democracy government was fortified by Konstantinos Mitsotakis’s near-dog-
matic free-market approach. The then premier’s determination to privatize or
close 40 heavily indebted state-controlled industries infuriated the group.
Although these companies had been draining state resources for years, 17N saw
New Democracy’s economic policy as a sustained assault against the labor force
and public sector. At an ideological level, 17N believed that New Democracy’s
conservatism with its neo-liberal, integrationist policy served the interests of for-
eign capital and multinationals, and aided American global economic hegemony.
Having reviewed New Democracy’s economic policy stance, the group conclud-
ed that the main motivation behind the sale of assets and industrial relations leg-
islation, presented by the Mitsotakis government as part of a plan to revive and
modernize the Greek economy, was an attempted structural rejuvenation of
Greek capitalism.
Nihilism, Exhibitionism, and Conspiracy-Theorizing: 17N in the 1990s
17N opposition to EC financial arrangements and the US-led Operation
Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf motivated a wave of attacks on ‘European’ and
‘Atlanticist’ targets throughout 1991. Strikes on British and American banks, the
British Petroleum (BP) offices, and the French military attaché maintained an
astonishing momentum and expressed the group’s angry reaction against Western
military intervention. 17N saw the 1990-91 Gulf War against Iraq as a classic
case of military aggression by the American imperialist machine. The symbolic
assassination of US Air Force Sergeant Ronald Stewart in March 1991 confirmed
this view. 17N used the attack on Stewart to underline the fact that the Kuwaiti
crisis “had nothing to do with respect of international law and everything to do
with the imposition of an American-dominated ‘new world order’ in the
region.”30
After the war, US President George Bush became a particular focus for
denunciation by the group. America’s ideological triumph in the Cold War and
its emergence in the early 1990s as the sole superpower was greeted with deep
disdain. The July 1991 US presidential official visit in Athens aggravated 17N’s
resentment for “Bush and American imperialism” and its “self-serving” global-
ist vision of a ‘New World Order.’ The group tried to use the Bush visit to force
the ‘Cyprus issue’ to the forefront of national debate. After targeting three
Turkish diplomats, 17N declared that Bush had come to impose (through “the
agent government of petty Mitsotakis”)31 a partition-confederation solution to
Cyprus problem, “which does not include full withdrawal of the Turkish occu-
pation troops and the return of all Greek Cypriots refugees to their homes.”32
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Comparing Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait to the Turkish invasion of
Northern Cyprus, 17N accused the Euro-Atlantic community of double standards
in the application of international law.
After 1991, 17N’s attitude toward the practice of violence changed. The
failed rocket attack in July 1992 against New Democracy Finance Minister
Yiannis Paleokrassas in the rush hour of Athens’ city-centre, which resulted in a
civilian death and numerous casualties, signalled an apparent inability to impose
control over the military instrument.  Persistent efforts by 17N to defend its
action and transfer blame for the casualties onto the police authorities also
revealed a growing detachment from reality. Attacked by the media for blind,
indiscriminate terrorism, 17N argued that the police authorities deliberately left
the 20-year-old student, Thanos Axarlian, to bleed to death in a crude attempt to
use the incident against the group. However, the kneecapping of an inconspicu-
ous New Democracy backbencher, Eleftherios Papadimitriou, four months later
for supposedly endorsing his “leader’s policy of selling off public property”33
offered additional evidence of the group’s confused thinking and nihilistic mind-
set.
The release on 17 November 1992 of a document entitled, Manifesto 1992,
confirmed that the assaults against Paleokrassas and Papadimitriou were part of
a radical shift in the group’s attitude and focus. A mixture of political analysis,
social commentary, and polemical hyperbole, Manifesto 1992 represented a 17N
attempt to display its revolutionary optimism and ideological continuity.34 At the
same time, the 15-page document was organizationally ordered to explain and
justify the group’s continuing presence on the post-1974 political scene.
Attacking parliamentarianism, capitalist democracy, and reformism, 17N re-
affirmed its ambition to organize working-class resistance and sustain “the pop-
ular movement” in its revolutionary mission. Despite the confident rhetoric of
Manifesto 1992, 17N no longer seemed to have a coherent political strategy. At
the same time, the group’s language became insistently bombastic, repetitive,
and sententious in tone. 
17N pledges to sustain a consistent level of military activity failed to mate-
rialize as the rate of violence continued to decline. By 1995, the annual level of
17N attacks had fallen to one, down from a peak of 22 in 1991. At the same time,
17N motives became more difficult to decipher. The mortaring of MEGA TV stu-
dios in March 1995 during the station’s main evening news confirmed the
impression that 17N’s attachment to unregulated violence had become the only
way for the group to maintain its ideological identity and preserve its raison
d’ètre.  Claiming credit for the attack, 17N tried to deflect criticism and vindi-
cate its extremism by suggesting a CIA-FBI-Greek media conspiracy plot against
the group.
During that time, 17N began to systematically attack the new Socialist pre-
mier, Costas Simitis, for his attempts to normalize relations with Turkey and
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bring Greece closer to the Euro-Atlantic community. Simitis outraged 17N in
1996 when, in a speech in the Greek Parliament hours after the Imia crisis was
defused, he thanked the US government for their diplomatic intervention. 17N
saw the Imia incident35 as a disgraceful politico-military defeat for Greece (“the
Greek Waterloo” in the group’s words) and denounced Simitis for his handling
of the episode. The group portrayed the Greek premier as a stooge of the
Americans, the EU, and the LMAT — “the best available after Papandreou’s res-
ignation.”36
The group always saw the application of violence as the most effective
form of political pressure against a US-run “world-disorder.” 17N’s reaction to
NATO’s strategy toward the Balkans led to the assassination of Brigadier
Stephen Saunders, the British military attaché in Athens, its last hit before the
arrests of summer 2002. 17N justified its act as a response to “a murderous impe-
rialist war.”37 NATO’s military campaign in Yugoslavia, the group declared, was
never a humanitarian mission in the region but an attack on a sovereign state in
blatant violation of long-standing international agreements and conventions.
Presenting the NATO leaders as a self-constituted posse of international vigi-
lantes, 17N further argued that NATO’s strategy toward the Balkans had been
shaped by the United States’ strategic interests and geo-political ambitions in
Europe rather than the local needs for conflict resolution and peacekeeping.
According to the group, the West’s failure to seek authorization from the UN
Security Council for the 78-day bombing campaign against targets in Kosovo
and Serbia represented the spirit of the new globalized international conscience.
By attacking Stephen Saunders, 17N thought it attacked the inbred arrogance of
the Anglo-Saxon political and military establishment, and its “deeply-rooted
belief that they are superior people and therefore legalized to annihilate” through
sanctions and bombardment “pariah nations,” bringing misery, disease, and death
upon innocent people.38
Fighting for Revolution?
Throughout its long campaign, the group maintained an extremely one-
dimensional view of a world peopled by heroes and villains. Combining ideo-
logical rigidity, fanatical nationalism, contempt for the existing order, and a cult
of violence for its own sake, 17N stubbornly refused to accept that its eclectic
belief system was incompatible with modern democratic principles. 
In the Korydallos court, Dimitris Koufodinas39 argued that from a histori-
cal perspective and given the revolutionary movement’s course in Greece, the
end of 17N’s story [had] yet to be written.40 He believed that 17N alone contin-
ued to represent in Greece a pure and undefiled Marxist-Leninist faith, dismiss-
ing the universal designation of them as terrorists and their actions as terrorism.
Challenging the court’s tendency to depict their acts as  senseless barbarity
devoid of any serious political content, Koufodinas asserted that, “this present
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could not put 17N on trial for what 17N really was.”41 In his view, 17N “was, as
the group had persistently stated from the very beginning, an organization of
simple, popular fighters. And since it came from the guts of the populace, it was
the populace’s voice that 17N listened to, and it was the populace’s own interests
that it tried to serve.”42
Going back to the group’s armed debut in 1975 and the assassination of the
CIA’s Richard Welch, Koufodinas tried to explain the source of 17N’s inspiration
and motivation. “In December ’75,” he stated, “a group of fighters decide to exe-
cute CIA’s station chief in Athens.” In the words of Koufodinas there
couldn’t be a more clear and justified action. CIA’s station chief was
and remains the long hand of American power in our country.
Running a 5th column of a few hundred agents positioned in neural-
gic posts inside the government, the state bureaucracy, the Army, the
political parties and the media, he controls and directs the political,
social and economic life of our country in relation to the interests of
the USA.  The Greek people know full well what CIA was all about,
know the role it has played since the Civil War. [The role it had
played] in every election, especially the 1961 election of rigging and
violence; in the assassination of [Greek MP] Lambrakis, and the mil-
itary junta and the tragedy of Cyprus. Why the Cyprus dossier has
not been opened yet? Whatever happened to your justice and your
democracy? Why so much selectivity for what is a crime and who is
really a criminal? Who let the [junta] torturers walk free? Was it the
people or was it your independent justice? For, the Greek people
know exactly why the CIA’s station chief in Greece was executed.
What they didn’t know exactly was who were behind this action and
that was thanks to a campaign of disinformation, distortion and dis-
orientation by the government, the political parties and the media.
When the campaign of 17N began, a campaign of disinformation
began with it and still continues to this day.43
At the same time, in an attempt to impose retrospective historical significance on
what 17N were and did, Koufodinas claimed that 
the left which 17N belonged to was the left of Lenin, Che Guevara
and Velouchiotis; the left of the October, Spanish, Chinese and
Cuban revolutions; the left of the anticolonial revolutions in Algeria
and Vietnam, the left of May ’68 and November ’73; the left of urban
guerrilla warfare.44
For Koufodinas, one could say anything one liked about 17N, except that
they were something other than what they always claimed to be and showed
themselves to be in all of their actions. 17N’s activity, he further argued, “had the
very same characteristics with the activity of the [Greek] resistance.” He did not
attempt to present himself as a modern-day Aris Velouchiotis, the charismatic
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guerrilla leader and founder of ELAS (the Greek People’s Liberation Army), but
it quickly became apparent that he idolized him. “When Aris would enter a vil-
lage and give under the nose of the Germans  a speech in the village square with
his armed partisans in formation, he was both demonstrating that armed resist-
ance was possible and  cultivating the ground for further activity.”45 By con-
necting ELAS’s military aims and practices to these of 17N, Koufodinas wanted
to show that the group’s armed struggle taking place “in a country that has expe-
rienced humiliation, exclusion, state-terrorism,  the absolute power of plutocrats,
policemen and  military judges” was merely defensive.46
Unlike Alexandros Giotopoulos,47 the group’s chief ideologue, who denied
participation in 17N,  Koufodinas — as one of the leaders and chief organizer of
the organization’s operations — took responsibility for the entire 17N experience
and sought to defend their violent actions by placing them in the political and his-
torical context of the period. An emblematic personality of 17N terrorism,
Koufodinas embraced the view that Greece’s “self-negating democracy” neces-
sitated exactly the kind of political violence they had undertaken.  Obsessively
clinging to his conviction that they took on “the capitalist state and its agents,”
Koufodinas maintained that 17N were attempting to create an insurrectionary
mood that would empower Greek people to take revolutionary political action. 
Alexandros Giotopoulos, on the other hand, maintained throughout the
trial that he had no involvement whatsoever with the group.  In denying all 963
charges against him, Giotopoulos asserted that “the role of the [17N] leader was
a police fabrication” and that the main reason why he was put behind bars was
because “the Americans, the British and their collaborators in the Greek govern-
ment want it that [way].”48 At the same time, he put a good deal of effort into
arguing that 17N must have been a horizontal cell organisation with no leader-
ship. At the same time, he placed the group’s actions in a political environment
which, in his view, necessitated armed intervention in daily life.  From his point
of view, 17N activity was not terrorism but “an armed political struggle with the
aim of toppling the capitalist regime in favour of an anti-bureaucratic form of
socialism that would give power to the people.”49 Giotopoulos also seemed to
believe that resorting to armed violence was a reasonable and calculated
response to certain social and political circumstances. As such, he saw militant
opposition as the only effective form of political pressure against American hege-
monism and an unresponsive regime.  According to his analysis, it was the 
perpetuation of the dependence on the USA, the reproduction of
huge economic inequalities and the total absence of a basic welfare
state together with the low level of worker’s income and the disap-
pearance of agricultural income which drove young people to take up
arms against  representatives of dominant circles, place bombs
against symbolic targets and violently clash with repressive mecha-
nisms.50 
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Giotopoulos’s attempts to link American hegemonism to long-standing
domestic problems were reminiscent of 17N’s Welch communiqué, in which
17N writers had argued that American presence on national soil was the root
cause of Greece’s underdevelopment and responsible for its perpetuation.51
Overall, Giotopoulos’s court testimony shed no light on any major issues
concerning the group’s prehistory, motives, purposes, and notions of political
power, though he spoke (in the few times when he chose to speak) with an
authority rivalled only by that of  Koufodinas. When asked by the chief judge if
he would find the courage like his co-defendant Koufodinas to accept responsi-
bility for his past actions, Giotopoulos characteristic reply was: “that’s exactly
what I would have done, had I actually been the leader.”52 However, one can-
not but be struck by Giotopoulos’s overall stance. Even if one sets aside the ludi-
crousness of his claim that he has been “framed in an Anglo-American conspir-
acy because of his activity against the 1967-74 Greek dictatorship,” the strongest
aspect of his self-defence was that he relied up to the end on a heavy dose of defi-
ance and mystique, as if this would somehow efface critique. Denouncing the
hearing as a travesty of justice (“the decision is ridiculous, the entire world is
laughing”) and bombastically calling “today’s Greece . . . a modern colony of the
United States,” Giotopoulos, like the group he led, refused to the very end to
modify his ideological rigidity and doctrinal inflexibility, and tried to construct a
‘language’ with which to publicize his political existence, claim legitimacy, and
pose as a representative of the entire community.
In that sense, Giotopoulos, like the majority of 17N members, had been
impervious to political logic. Although the group saw its violence as an auda-
cious protest against the Greek establishment, it never moved beyond terrorism
to provoke a situation of crisis for the establishment it so bitterly opposed. Given
its conception of political intervention and extra-parliamentary activism, 17N’s
organizational evolution was always certain to culminate into a full-scale cam-
paign of terrorist violence. Ignoring the fact that violence “should not take the
place of the political purpose, nor obliterate it,”53 17N continued the sporadic
killing and wounding of high-profile targets as the most effective way to crystal-
lize public disaffection against the regime and embed itself in mainstream con-
sciousness.  
For a Place in History
What was 17N after all?  According to Giotopoulos’s defence lawyer,
Yiannis Rachiotis, 17N was “an organisation very different” from the rest of the
Left and from other armed groups that operated in Western Europe.54 For
Rachiotis, “the [Greek] left as we all know was, until 17N’s emergence, on the
defensive.”55 Offering a left-slanted interpretation of history, Rachiotis said that
17N epitomized “the attacking left, the hunted left that finally decides to become
the hunter,” seeking to restore a sense of proportion and balance.56
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History, however, will judge 17N as a failed group. Irrespective of
Rachiotis’s readings and despite attempts by group members to justify their
actions as an extension of a historically defined Greek communist tradition and
a quest for national independence and nationhood, 17N was never an authentic
revolutionary group. Rather, it was a clandestine band of disillusioned armed
militants with a flair for revolutionary rhetoric and symbolism for whom terror-
ism had become a way of life: a career.  It was not even “a variable of the move-
ment gone crazy,” to use the phraseology of Italian ‘terrorist-philosopher’
Antonio Negri.57 If Koufodinas’s apologia confirmed one thing, it was that he
and the majority of his 17N comrades lived in a closed, self-referential world
where terrorism became a way of life from which they found it impossible to
walk away. Koufodinas’s stubborn refusal throughout the trial to confront reali-
ty made him speak like a man whose entire sense of life revolved around the
belief that destiny had somehow granted him this extraordinary privilege that he
must guard well and pass on at some historical point. Feeling themselves to be a
genuine instrument of history, 17N leaders advanced the view that it did not mat-
ter that there could never be a military victory as long as 17N ‘intervened’ and
‘resisted.’ For 17N’s operational leader, Dimitris Koufodinas, and the majority
of his comrades what was (and probably remains) important was the act of
‘resistance’ itself. And the notion that blood and death, even your own, somehow
would carry the mission forward, ultimately securing 17N a place in history.
George Kassimeris is Senior Research Fellow in Conflict and Terrorism at the
University of Wolverhampton.
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